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A note on “achieving security, robust cheating resistance, and
high-efficiency for outsourcing large matrix multiplication
computation to a malicious cloud”
Zhengjun Cao1, Lihua Liu2,∗
Abstract. We show that the Lei et al.’s scheme [Information Sciences, 280
(2014), 205-217] fails, because the verifying equation does not hold over the infinite
field R. For the field R, the computational errors should be considered seriously. We
also remark that the incurred communication cost in the scheme could be overtake
the computational gain, which makes it somewhat artificial.
Keywords. Cloud computing, outsourcing computation, matrix multiplication,
malicious server.
1 Introduction
Recently, Lei et al. [1] have proposed a scheme for outsourcing matrix multiplication com-
putation over infinite field R. In this note, we show that the Lei et al.’s scheme fails because the
verifying equation does only hold over any finite field, instead of the infinite field R. For the field
R, the computational errors, especially rounding errors, should be considered carefully. We also
remark that the incurred communication cost in the scheme could be overtake the computational
gain, which makes it somewhat unpractical.
2 Review of the Lei et al.’s scheme
Let X(i, j), xi,j or xij denote the entry in ith row and jth column in matrix X. Define
δx,y = 1, if x = y; δx,y = 0, if x 6= y. Given a matrix X ∈ R
m×n and a matrix Y ∈ Rn×s, the
resource-constrained client wants to securely outsource the computation of XY to the cloud.
The scheme can be described as follows (see Table 1).
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Table 1: The Lei et al.’s scheme for outsourcing matrix multiplication computation
Client Server
Setup. Pick three sets of random numbers
{α1, · · · , αm}, {β1, · · · , βn} {γ1, · · · , γs}.
Generate three random permutations:
π1 over {1, · · · ,m}, π2 over {1, · · · , n},
π3 over {1, · · · , s}. Set them as the secret key.
Input X ∈ Rm×n, Y ∈ Rn×s.
Transformation
X′(i, j) = (αi/βj)X(π1(i), π2(j)),
Y′(i, j) = (βi/γj)Y(π2(i), π3(j)).
Outsourcing Send X′,Y′ to the server. Compute Z′ = X′Y′
and return it to the client.
Composition
Z(i, j) =
(
γ
pi−1
3
(j)/αpi−1
1
(i)
)
Z′(π−11 (i), π
−1
3 (j)).
Verification
Pick an s× 1 random 0/1 vector r.
Check that X(Yr)− Zr
?
= (0, · · · , 0)T .
Repeat the process l times.
Output Z.
The correctness of this procedure can be argued as follows. Set the matrixes P1,P2,P3 as
P1(i, j) = αiδpi1(i),j , P2(i, j) = βiδpi2(i),j , P3(i, j) = γiδpi3(i),j .
Then
P−11 (i, j) = (αj)
−1δ
pi−1
1
(i),j , P
−1
2 (i, j) = (βj)
−1δ
pi−1
2
(i),j , P
−1
3 (i, j) = (γj)
−1δ
pi−1
3
(i),j .
Hence,
P1XP
−1
2 = (αi/βj)X(π1(i), π2(j)) = X
′(i, j),
P2YP
−1
3 = (βi/γj)Y(π2(i), π3(j)) = Y
′(i, j),
P−11 Z
′P3 =
(
γpi−1
3
(j)/αpi−1
1
(i)
)
Z′(π−11 (i), π
−1
3 (j)) = Z(i, j).
2
Since X′Y′ = Z′, we have
Z = P−11 X
′Y′P3 = P
−1
1 P1XP
−1
2 P2YP
−1
3 P3 = XY.
Thus, X(Yr) = Zr.
Unfortunately, the above reasoning process is true only in some symbolic computing envi-
ronments. But in a practical floating-point number system, computational errors involved in
the above procedure should be considered seriously.
3 The checking mechanism in the scheme fails
3.1 The checking equation holds only over any finite fields
Suppose that a floating-point number system is characterized by four integers [2]: base χ,
precision p, exponent range [L,U ]. Then its accuracy can be characterized by a quantity known
as machine precision, ǫ. If a given real number x is not exactly representable as a floating-point
number, then it must be approximated by some “nearby” floating-point number. The process
of choosing fl(x) to approximate x is called rounding, and the error introduced by such an
approximation is called rounding error.
Consider the simple computation x(y + z). In floating-point arithmetic we have
fl(y + z) = (y + z)(1 + θ1), with |θ1| ≤ ǫ,
so that
fl(x(y + z)) = (x((y + z)(1 + θ1)))(1 + θ2), with |θ2| ≤ ǫ
= x(y + z)(1 + θ1 + θ2 + θ1θ2)
≈ x(y + z)(1 + θ1 + θ2)
= x(y + z)(1 + θ), with |θ| = |θ1 + θ2| ≤ 2ǫ.
Let X = (xij)m×n,Y = (yij)n×s, r = (r1, · · · , rs)
T . Then the first entry of X(Yr) is
Σnj=1x1j(Σ
s
i=1 yjiri) = x11(y11r1 + y12r2 + · · ·+ y1srs)
+x12(y21r1 + y22r2 + · · · + y2srs)
+ · · ·
+x1n(yn1r1 + yn2r2 + · · ·+ ynsrs)
= r1Σ
n
i=1 x1iyi1 + · · ·+ rsΣ
n
i=1 x1iyis
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Since
Z(1, 1) =
γ
pi−1
3
(1)
αpi−1
1
(1)
Z′(π−11 (1), π
−1
3 (1)) =
γ
pi−1
3
(1)
αpi−1
1
(1)
[
Σnk=1X
′(π−11 (1), k)Y
′(k, π−13 (1))
]
=
γ
pi−1
3
(1)
α
pi−1
1
(1)
[(α
pi−1
1
(1)
β1
x1,pi2(1)
)(
β1
γ
pi−1
3
(1)
ypi2(1),1
)
+
· · ·+
(αpi−1
1
(1)
βn
x1,pi2(n)
)(
βn
γ
pi−1
3
(1)
ypi2(n),1
)]
...
Z(1, s) =
γpi−1
3
(s)
α
pi−1
1
(1)
Z′(π−11 (1), π
−1
3 (s)) =
γpi−1
3
(s)
α
pi−1
1
(1)
[
Σnk=1X
′(π−11 (1), k)Y
′(k, π−13 (s))
]
=
γ
pi−1
3
(s)
αpi−1
1
(1)
[(α
pi−1
1
(1)
β1
x1,pi2(1)
)(
β1
γpi−1
3
(s)
ypi2(1),1
)
+
· · ·+
(αpi−1
1
(1)
βn
x1,pi2(n)
)(
βn
γ
pi−1
3
(s)
ypi2(n),1
)]
the first entry of Zr is
γ
pi−1
3
(1)
αpi−1
1
(1)
[(α
pi−1
1
(1)
β1
x1,pi2(1)
)(
β1
γpi−1
3
(1)
ypi2(1),1
)
+ · · ·+
(α
pi−1
1
(1)
βn
x1,pi2(n)
)(
βn
γpi−1
3
(1)
ypi2(n),1
)]
r1
+ · · ·
+
γ
pi−1
3
(s)
α
pi−1
1
(1)
[(α
pi−1
1
(1)
β1
x1,pi2(1)
)(
β1
γ
pi−1
3
(s)
ypi2(1),1
)
+ · · · +
(α
pi−1
1
(1)
βn
x1,pi2(n)
)(
βn
γ
pi−1
3
(s)
ypi2(n),1
)]
rs.
Since {α1, · · · , αm}, {β1, · · · , βn} {γ1, · · · , γs} are randomly chosen in R, the total rounding
error in the above equation approximates to x¯1y¯1nsǫ, where x¯1 =
1
n
Σni=1x1i, y¯1 =
1
n
Σnj=1yj1, and
ǫ is the machine precision. Therefore, the practical computational result is
X(Yr)− Zr = (x¯1y¯1nsǫ, · · · , x¯my¯mnsǫ)
T .
Thus, the original checking mechanism in the Lei et al.’s scheme fails. The authors did not pay
more attentions to the differences between the arithmetic over the infinite field R and that over
any finite field.
To fix the scheme, one has to check that∣∣∣∣ viui − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ λnsǫ, i = 1, · · · ,m
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where
X(Yr) = (u1, · · · , um)
T , Zr = (v1, · · · , vm)
T ,
and λ is a fault-tolerant parameter. If all m inequalities are true, then output Z.
3.2 The revised version of Lei et al.’s scheme is insecure
Though the computational errors have been considered in the revised version of Lei et al.’s
scheme, we show it is insecure because the malicious server can cheat the client to accept a
wrong result.
To do this, the malicious server computes Z′ = X′Y′ and returns Ẑ′ to the client, where
Ẑ′ = Z′ +

ρ 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
0 0 · · · 0

,
ρ = (χ − 1)ǫ, χ is the base of the underlying floating-point number system. In such case, we
have
Z(π1(1), π3(1)) = (γ1/α1) [Z
′(1, 1) + ρ],
Zr = (v1, · · · , vpi1(1) +
γ1
α1
rpi3(1)ρ, · · · , vm)
T
Hence, ∣∣∣∣∣vpi1(1) +
γ1
α1
rpi3(1)ρ
upi1(1)
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣ vpi1(1)upi1(1) − 1
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
γ1
α1
ρ
upi1(1)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
The probability of the event that∣∣∣∣ vpi1(1)upi1(1) − 1
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
γ1
α1
upi1(1)
∣∣∣∣∣ · (χ− 1)ǫ ≤ λnsǫ
approximates to 1, because n, s are supposed to be sufficiently large. Thus, the malicious server
can cheat the client to accept a wrong result Z, where
Z(i, j) =
(
γ
pi−1
3
(j)/αpi−1
1
(i)
)
Ẑ′(π−11 (i), π
−1
3 (j)).
4 Further discussions
The authors [1] claim that the proposed scheme is feasible due to there exists a gap between
O(mn+ns+ms) and O(mns). Therefore, as long asm,n, s become sufficiently large, the scheme
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allows the client to outsource the computations to the cloud and gain substantial computational
savings.
We now want to stress that the client has to interact with the untrusted cloud via a non
authenticated link, by sending X′,Y′ and receiving Z′. From the practical point of view, the
communication costs (including authentication of the exchanged data, the possible underlying
encryption/decryption, the time delay during the interaction, etc.) could be far more than the
above computational gain. That means the scheme is somewhat unrealistic.
One might suggest to constrain the Lei et al.’s scheme to some finite fields. But we would like
to stress that matrix multiplication computation over finite fields is of little practical importance.
For example, the most popular linear programming cannot be constrained to any finite field.
5 Conclusion
We show that the Lei et al.’s scheme for outsourcing matrix multiplication computation
over the infinite field R is insecure. We think, the problem that what computations are worth
delegating privately by individuals and companies to an untrusted cloud remains open. The
cloud computing community has not yet found a good for-profit model convincing individuals
to pay for this or that computational service.
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